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CHOOSING CORPORATIONS OVER CONSUMERS: THE 
FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT OF 2017 AND THE CFPB 
 
Christopher L. Peterson* 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The track record of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) is a 
continuing focal point in national political debates. Critics of the agency have argued 
that the Bureau lacks accountability and has been too aggressive in its rulemaking, 
supervisory, and enforcement programs. Defenders of the agency argue that the 
Bureau’s work benefits millions of Americans while preserving access to credit and that 
the agency is a positive example of government leadership. In the first year of the 
Trump administration, this national conversation has coalesced around H.R. 10, the 
proposed Financial Choice Act of 2017 (“Choice Act”),1 sponsored by House Financial 
Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling and supported by President Donald J. 
Trump. The Choice Act substantially amends or repeals many of the reforms adopted 
in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act2 (“Dodd-Frank 
Act”) after the financial collapse of 2008 and ensuing Great Recession. While the 
proposed Choice Act addresses a variety of banking and financial industry issues, Title 
VII of the bill focuses on the CFPB. The proposed legislation would rename the CFPB 
the “Consumer Law Enforcement Agency” and dramatically curtail the agency’s legal 
authorities in a variety of ways. The Choice Act would, for example: eliminate the 
CFPB’s supervisory authority,3 repeal the Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition of “unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive acts or practices” in consumer finance,4 and eliminate the CFPB’s 
independent source of funding.5  
To inform discussion of the Financial Choice Act in particular and consumer 
financial policy making more generally, there is an ongoing need for descriptive 
empirical analysis of the CFPB’s law enforcement track record. This article presents an 
analysis classifying all of the CFPB’s publicly announced enforcement actions from the 
agency’s inception through the end of the 2016 calendar year. Moreover, this article also 
analyzes how the Financial Choice Act would have affected these CFPB enforcement 
actions if it had been controlling law in recent years. Thus, this study asks a hypothetical 
question: If the Choice Act were the law of the United States from 2012 to 2016, how 
would the CFPB’s enforcement track record have changed? Answers to this question 
                                                          
 * John J. Flynn Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law. 
This Article draws on remarks given and helpful feedback received at the 2017 Fisher 
Memorial Program of the American Bar Association Business Law Section’s Consumer 
Financial Services Committee. This research was made possible, in part, through 
generous support from the Albert and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence at 
the University of Utah. Michael Harmond provided valuable research assistance. 
1 See Financial Choice Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017). 
2 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 
22, 31, and 42 U.S.C.) (hereinafter the “Dodd-Frank Act”). 
3 H.R. 10, § 727. 
4 Id. at § 711(a). 
5 Id. at § 713. 
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may assist the U.S. Senate in its deliberations over whether to follow the lead of 
Representative Hensarling and President Trump. More generally, this study can help 
inform policy makers, practicing attorneys, scholars, the press, and students of 
consumer finance on what the future may hold if Congress adopts the Financial Choice 
Act. This study also holds a mirror to the CFPB itself, illustrating the political resistance 
that has emerged to the Bureau’s law enforcement work. 
Part II of this article briefly summarizes the CFPB’s supervisory, fair lending, and 
enforcement authorities under the Dodd-Frank Act and then reviews the Choice Act’s 
proposed changes to this authority. Part III explains the study’s methodology, Part IV 
reports and analyzes results, and Part V provides a brief conclusion. 
 
II. BACKGROUND: PROPOSED CHANGES TO CFPB UNDER THE 
FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT OF 2017 
 
In 2008 the American banking industry collapsed causing 11 trillion dollars in 
wealth to vanish and leaving 21 million Americans without work.6 Over 9 million 
homes were lost to foreclosure or short sales.7 The Great Recession caused profound 
health and welfare consequences hurting millions of Americans in all fifty states. Ill-
advised consumer finance led to greater homelessness, hunger, disease, and suicide.8 
Congress responded to this national crisis with the Dodd-Frank Act which, among 
other reforms, established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.9 Structurally, the 
CFPB is an independent agency housed within the Federal Reserve Board. Instead of 
funding the CFPB through the congressional appropriations process, the Dodd-Frank 
Act provided that the Fed must, at the CFPB’s request, transfer to the CFPB an 
inflation-adjusted sum equal to 12% of the Federal Reserve’s 2009 annual operating 
expenses.10 The Fed gathers its own funding through its operations which include 
collecting interest on U.S. Treasury bonds and foreign currency investments held by the 
system through its open market operations, fees received for services provided, such as 
operation of the Automated Clearinghouse (“ACH”) system, and interest on loans 
made to banks through the “discount window.”11 Congress tasked the CFPB with 
protecting Americans from harmful consumer financial practices. To fulfill this mission, 
                                                          
6 U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xv (2011). 
7 Laura Kusisto, Many Who Lost Homes to Foreclosure in Last Decade Won’t Return—
NAR, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 20, 2015, 12:50 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/many-who-lost-homes-to-foreclosure-in-last-decade-
wont-return-nar-1429548640. 
8 See Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: 
An Empirical Review, 90 TULANE L. REV. 1057, 1059-60 (2016) (hereinafter CFPB 
Empirical Review) (collecting empirical research). 
9 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, tit. X (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481 et seq.). Congress 
entitled Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act which establishes the CFPB, the Consumer 
Financial Protection Act. 12 U.SC. § 5491(a). 
10 Id. at § 5497(a)(1)–(2). 
11 Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Frequently Asked Questions: What does it 
Mean that the Federal Reserve is “independent” within the government”?, (March 1, 2017), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12799.htm. 
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Congress authorized the Bureau “to administer, enforce, and otherwise implement the 
provisions of Federal consumer financial law.”12 
Organizationally, Congress authorized the Bureau to establish a variety of offices 
and legal authorities within the CFPB. First, the CFPB established a consumer response 
office to respond to consumer complaints and inquiries regarding financial services 
businesses.13 The CFPB’s Consumer Response office maintains a web-based and 
telephone intake portal that handles over some quarter-million inquiries in over 180 
languages each year.14 The Dodd-Frank Act required the creation of several consumer 
education and empowerment offices within the CFPB. These offices include: a financial 
education office,15 an office for providing information, guidance, and technical 
assistance on providing financial services to traditionally underserved communities,16 
an office focused on the financial protection of older Americans,17 the office of a 
private student lending ombudsman,18 and an office of military service member 
affairs.19 The CFPB also has an Office of Regulations which is responsible for 
exercising the Bureau’s rulemaking authority under consumer financial laws. Consumer 
financial laws are defined to include Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act itself, as well as a 
list of enumerated consumer financial protection law that include the Truth in Lending 
Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and others.20 
                                                          
12 12 U.S.C. § 5512(a). 
13 See id. at § 5534 (establishing consumer complaint response authorities and 
responsibilities). 
14 FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU: 
FISCAL YEAR 2016, 23 (November 15, 2016). 
15 See 12 U.S.C. § 5493(d). 
16 Id. at § 5493(b)(2). 
17 Id. at § 5493(g). 
18 Id. at § 5535. 
19 Id. at § 5493(e). 
20 Id. § 5511. The enumerated consumer laws include: The Alternative Mortgage 
Transaction Parity Act of 1982, Public L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1545 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 39); The Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, 
90 Stat. 257 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667–1667f); The Electronic Fund 
Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 92 Stat. 3728 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 
41, subch. 6); The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 88 Stat. 1521 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. 4); The Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. 
No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1511 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. 1, pt. D); 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. 3) (excluding §§ 615(e), 628, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m(e), 1681w); 
The Home Owners Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-216, 112 Stat. 897 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 49); The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. 
L. No. 90-321, 91 Stat. 874 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. 5); Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act § 43(b)-(f), 64 Stat. 873, (codified as amended 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 1831t(c)–(f)); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 502-09, 113 Stat. 
1338, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6802-6809) (excluding § 505 as it applies to 
§ 501(b)); The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 
1125 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 29); The Home Ownership and Equity 
Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2190 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. ch. 41); The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 27); The 
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Borrowing from the much older Federal Trade Commission Act, Congress also gave 
the CFPB enforcement and rulemaking authority to identify and stop any “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices” as well as adding a new category of “abusive” acts or 
practices.21 While the prohibition of abusive financial acts or practices was 
controversial, as an empirical matter, the CFPB’s law enforcement staff have 
overwhelmingly focused on identifying and stopping deceptive consumer financial 
practices that are likely to mislead reasonable consumers about a material aspect of the 
service.22 
The CFPB’s law enforcement responsibilities are implemented through the 
Bureau’s Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending Division (SEFL). The Bureau 
supervises large banks and credit Unions with over $10 billion in assets, as well as other 
supervised non-bank consumer finance business specified by Congress or Bureau 
regulations.23 Supervised consumer finance companies include mortgage originators, 
brokers, servicers, and foreclosure assistance providers; private student loan originators 
and student loan servicers; 24 and payday lenders;25 as well as large consumer reporting 
agencies,26 debt collection businesses,27 international remittance providers,28 and 
automobile finance companies.29 CFPB supervisory staff conducts risk-based, 
confidential examinations that audit supervised business to ensure compliance with 
consumer financial protection laws. Several hundred CFPB examiners regularly travel 
throughout the country visiting consumer financial businesses to conduct exams on 
sight.30 The Bureau’s supervisory staff publishes an examination manual to assist 
                                                          
S.A.F.E. Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2810 (codified 
as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 51);The Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 
146 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 41, subch. 1); The Truth in Savings Act, Pub. 
L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2334 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 44); Omnibus 
Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 626, 123 Stat. 524, 678-79 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1638); and The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, Pub. 
L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 590 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ch. 42). Also, Congress 
subsequently gave the CFPB enforcement authority under the Military Lending Act.  
Pub. L. No. 109-34, 120 Stat. 2266 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 987, 15 U.S.C. 
§1607).  However, the Department of Defense retains rulemaking authority for this 
statute.  Id. § 987(h). 
21  12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536. 
22 Peterson, CFPB Empirical Review, supra note 8, at 1093 (finding that in CFPB 
enforcement cases through 2015 over 90% of all consumer relief was awarded in 
cases in which the CFPB uncovered evidence that defendants illegally deceived 
customers). 
23 Id. at §§ 5514, 5515.  
24 Id. § 1090.106. 
25 Id. at § 5514(a). 
26 12 C.F.R. § 1090.104. 
27 Id. § 1090.105. 
28 Id. § 1090.107. 
29 Id. § 1090.108. 
30 See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND 
EXAMINATION MANUAL, at Overview 10-13 (March 2017), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201706_cfpb_s
upervision-and-examination-manual.pdf (for an overview of the CFPB’s examination 
process). 
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companies in preparing for exams, and regular Supervisory Highlights reports sharing 
public results of the examiners’ work.31 
Congress also created the CFPB’s Office of Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity, 
which is housed within the Bureau’s SEFL division.32 This office is responsible for 
providing oversight and enforcement of consumer financial laws that ensure equitable 
and nondiscriminatory access to credit including in particular the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act.33  
The Bureau enforces other consumer financial laws through an Office of 
Enforcement which investigates and pursues enforcement actions against businesses 
and individuals governed by consumer financial laws. The Bureau has enforcement 
jurisdiction over any covered person or service provider to a covered person, except 
for small banks and credit unions, automobile dealers that do not routinely engage in 
“buy-here, pay-here” financing, and a short list of other specifically excluded 
businesses.34 Congress authorized the Bureau to enforce federal consumer financial 
laws either through administrative enforcement procedures or through its own 
authority to litigate in federal court.35 CFPB administrative enforcement actions are 
conducted under a CFPB regulation that largely mirrors other administrative 
enforcement agencies, with trials before an administrative law judge and decisions 
reviewable on appeal to the Bureau’s Director.36 Congress also authorized the Bureau 
to bring enforcement actions in Federal court independent of the Department of 
Justice.37 In both administrative proceedings and civil litigation, the CFPB is entitled to 
seek any appropriate legal or equitable relief including restitution, disgorgement, and 
civil money penalties.38   
The proposed Financial Choice Act of 201739 would substantially revise and repeal 
much of the Dodd-Frank Act. Among many changes, the Choice Act would repeal 
Dodd-Frank’s orderly liquidation authority provisions and eliminate the stress testing 
and emergency planning requirements for many of the largest financial institutions. 
With respect to the CFPB, the Choice Act would eliminate or restrict many of the 
Bureau’s powers, offices, and authorities. Initially, the Choice Act appears to embrace 
and prioritize the CFPB’s law enforcement mission by renaming the CFPB the 
                                                          
31 See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND 
EXAMINATION MANUAL, (March 2017), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201706_cfpb_s
upervision-and-examination-manual.pdf; Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
Supervisory Highlights, Issue 15, Spring 2017. 
32 12 U.S.C. § 5493(c). 
33 Id. at §5493(c)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 1691. 
34 12 U.S.C. §§ 5515(a), (c); § 5516(a), (d). Unless they are acting as a service 
provider to a covered person, other businesses explicitly excluded from CFPB 
enforcement authority include nonfinancial retailers of goods or services, real estate 
brokers, manufactured home retailers, accountants or tax preparers, and, in some 
circumstances, attorneys.  Id. § 5517. But See CFPB v. Fredrick J. Hanna & Assocs., 114 
F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1362–70 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (holding debt collection lawsuit mill subject 
to CFPB jurisdiction under the FDCPA and the Dodd-Frank Act). 
35 12 U.S.C. §§ 5563, 5564. 
36 12 C.F.R. pt. 1081. 
37 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a) (2012). 
38 Id. § 5565(a)(2). 
39 Financial Choice Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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Consumer Law Enforcement Agency (“CLEA”).40 The bill would remove the agency’s 
independent source of funding, subjecting it to annual congressional appropriations and 
potential future budget cuts.41 The bill would also facilitate changes to sub-units within 
the CFPB by allowing the director of the new CLEA to dissolve and eliminate the 
various consumer education and empowerment offices focused on particular vulnerable 
groups, including the Office of Service Member Affairs, the National Student Lending 
Ombudsman’s office, and the Office of Older Americans. The bill also subjects CFPB 
employees to the federal government’s general compensation schedule which would 
have the effect of imposing significant pay cuts on existing and future staff 90 days after 
the Act becomes law.42 
The Choice Act also eliminates the CFPB’s research, market monitoring, and 
publishing authorities.43 The bill would prohibit the new agency from making 
consumers’ complaint narratives public.44 And the bill creates a new restriction on using 
private information about consumers stating that “[t]he Agency may not request, 
obtain, access, collect, use, retain, or disclose any nonpublic personal information about 
a consumer” without explicit permission from each consumer.45 Unlike private 
companies, the Federal government does not generally enter into contracts with 
consumers making the logistics of obtaining permission to gather market data 
potentially insurmountable. Simultaneously, Title VII of the Choice Act provides no 
restrictions on the ability of banks or other financial service providers to collect and 
share data about the public. 
Ironically, while limiting the Bureau’s ability to gather useful market data the 
Choice Act simultaneously creates a host of new obligations to conduct empirical 
studies. the legislation would create a new Office of Economic Analysis (“OEA”) 
within the agency tasked with engaging in cost-benefit analysis of public action.46 The 
Choice Act would require a cost-benefit analysis, and require the Director to consider 
that analysis, prior to adopting any rule.47 The bill would also impose upon the new 
OEA a constantly revolving docket of periodically scheduled retrospective cost-benefit 
reviews and public reports on every existing regulation overseen by the agency.48 
Additionally, the bill requires the Director to issue advisory opinions on request.49 But 
ironically, the legislation would also instruct courts to ignore these advisory opinions 
by reversing the current law that requires courts to grant deference to the CFPB’s 
interpretation of the laws and regulations it enforces.50 With nearly twenty different 
enumerated consumer financial laws and their related regulations falling within the 
jurisdiction of the agency, these retrospective analyses and advisory opinions would 
                                                          
40 Id. at § 711(a). 
41 Id. at § 713. 
42 Id. at § 723. Currently, on average CFPB employees make “somewhat less than 
a third-year investment banking analyst.” Matt Levine, Are Bank Regulators Overpaid?, 
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Apr. 22, 2014, 10:53 AM), 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-04-22/are-bank-regulators-overpaid. 
43 H.R. 10, § 724 (2017). 
44 Id. at § 725. 
45 Id. at § 731.  
46 Id. at §717. 
47 Id. at § 717. 
48 Id. at § 717(4). 
49 Id. at § 721. 
50 Id. at § 718. 
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require the expenditure of substantial resources on activities that do not directly benefit 
victims of illegal practices or provide legal certainty to industry. Moreover, to ensure 
these ongoing tasks occupy the CLEA’s staff time, the legislation also creates a new 
independent inspector general’s office to police the agency.51 
Although the Choice Act appears to prioritize law enforcement, the bill would 
erect a variety of procedural hurdles in the path of law enforcement investigations, 
administrative actions, and federal litigation. For example, the Choice Act would give 
the new OEA a gatekeeping role in all law enforcement matters. Under the new law, 
the Agency would be required to conduct a specific cost-benefit study prior to initiating 
any law enforcement case.52 Moreover, the law appears to require a second, separate 
cost-benefit analysis before resolving any disputed enforcement action with a consent 
order.53 And presumably, the Office of Enforcement within the CLEA would compete 
for the OEA’s cost-benefit analysis resources with the slate of ongoing studies required 
on all the agency’s existing regulations. The bill would also grant defendants in 
administrative enforcement actions a right to compel the Agency to remove the case to 
Federal court, thereby limiting the Agency’s tactical options.54 The bill would also slow 
down investigations by giving civil investigative demand respondents the right to 
respond more slowly and to challenge the Agency’s right to collect information in 
Federal court.55 The Choice Act also eliminates the common pool of civil money 
penalty funds that provides consumer relief to victims of insolvent defendants.56 
Currently, this pool provides thousands of victimized families compensation when the 
businesses or individuals that hurt them are bankrupt or have hidden their assets. Under 
the Choice Act, any excess civil money penalties would simply be handed over to 
Congress while families victimized by insolvent defendants would receive no 
compensation.57 
The Choice Act would also eliminate the CFPB’s supervisory authority.58 Under 
the Choice Act, the new CLEA would no longer conduct compliance audits of large 
banks, mortgage brokers, credit reporting agencies, debt collectors, and other 
businesses currently subject to CFPB supervision. The CFPB schedules its exams by 
analyzing which businesses present the greatest risk of violating federal consumer 
protection laws and causing harm to consumers.59 Examiners are tasked with helping 
the industry achieve consistent compliance standards for federal consumer financial 
laws nationwide.60 The Choice Act change would eliminate the CFPB’s largest office 
                                                          
51 Id. at § 714. 
52 Id. at § 717. 
53 Id. at § 717. 
54 H.R. 10 at § 715. 
55 Id. at § 716. 
56 Id. at § 722. The Choice Act would return undistributed civil money penalties 
to Congress, instead of providing relief to victims of illegal consumer protection law 
violations. Id. 
57 Id.  
58 Id. at § 712. 
59 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Supervisory Highlights, Issue 1, at 3, Fall 
2012. See also Jean Braucher & Angela Littwin, Examination as a Method of Consumer 
Protection, 87 TEMPLE L. REV. 807, 837-40 (2015) (analyzing CFPB’s risk-based 
supervisory policies). 
60 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Supervisory Highlights, Issue 1, at 3, Fall 
2012. 
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that houses several hundred compliance examiners that travel the country conducting 
compliance audits of supervised businesses.61 Supervision is one of the key methods 
through which the CFPB monitors and responds to spikes and trends in industry 
problems.62 Eliminating this supervisory oversight would take away the CFPB’s primary 
method of resolving compliance problems outside of a public, adversarial enforcement 
action context. Under the Choice Act, the new CLEA would not have access to 
consumer finance business records unless it was prepared to sue to obtain those records 
in Federal court. Instead, the Choice Act would return supervisory authority for 
consumer protection to the banking regulations responsible for supervision prior to the 
2008 financial crisis. And for non-bank companies such as debt collectors, credit 
reporting agencies, and payday lenders, federal compliance exams would simply cease 
to exist. Thus, while the legislation creates higher hurdles for bringing enforcement 
cases, it also eliminates the agency’s most powerful non-adversarial tool for gathering 
compliance information necessary to surmount those hurdles. 
Substantively, the Choice Act also changes several consumer protection laws. The 
most far reaching change is the repeal of the Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition of “unfair, 
deceptive and abusive acts or practices.”63 The CFPB’s law enforcement program has 
focused more on deterring deception by consumer finance businesses than any other 
regulatory requirement.64 In the first five years of the CFPB’s enforcement program, 
“[d]eception was, by far, the most commonly pleaded claim in CFPB matters.”65 Cases 
that included a deception claim produced over 90 percent of the consumer relief 
provided to the American public.66 Without the Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition of 
unfair, deceptive and abusive practices, the new CLEA would not have a law within its 
jurisdiction that would allow it to challenge even intentional lying by banks or other 
financial service providers to their customers. As they did before the fiscal crisis, 
prudential banking regulators would continue to have enforcement authority for unfair 
and deceptive practices,67 but—bizarrely—the new agency specifically tasked with 
consumer law enforcement would not.68 
The Choice Act would also eliminate the CFPB’s regulatory and enforcement 
authority over what is arguably the most controversial segment of the consumer finance 
industry: short-term, high-interest lending. Specifically, the Choice Act would prohibit 
                                                          
61 See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB SUPERVISION AND 
EXAMINATION MANUAL, at Overview 10-13 (March 2017), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201706_cfpb_s
upervision-and-examination-manual.pdf (for an overview of the CFPB’s examination 
process). 
62 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Supervisory Highlights, Issue 15, at 25-26, 
Spring 2017. 
63 H.R. 10, § 735(a) (“The Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (12 U.S.C. 
5481 et seq.) is amended— 
(1) in section 1021(b)(2), by striking ‘from unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and 
practices …’”). 
64 Peterson, CFPB Empirical Review, supra note 8, at 1095. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 See Braucher & Littwin, supra note 59, at 821 (discussing the tension between 
safety and soundness oversight and consumer protection at prudential banking 
regulators). 
68 H.R. 10, §§ 735-736. 
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the new Consumer Law Enforcement Agency from enforcing the law “with respect to 
payday loans, vehicle title loans, or other similar loans.”69 Payday loans are illegal under 
the laws of about a dozen states, carry average interest rates of around 400 percent, and 
are often criticized by consumer advocates as predatory debt traps.70 Others view 
payday loans are a necessary tool for liquidity constrained consumers and believe 
prohibition of the product would lead to unintended consequences.71 The public 
overwhelmingly supports usury limits that effectively ban the product.72 The Dodd-
Frank Act does not allow the CFPB to eliminate payday lending with an interest rate 
limit, but it does prohibit payday lenders from using unfair, deceptive or abusive 
marketing, underwriting, or collection tactics.73 While the Federal Trade Commission 
would continue to have jurisdiction over non-bank lenders, under the proposed Choice 
Act the new Consumer Law Enforcement Agency would not have the authority to bring 
an enforcement action against a payday lender that intentionally lies about its products 
or services. The new CLEA would also be powerless to enforce enumerated federal 
consumer protection laws including the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
against payday lenders. Under the Choice Act payday lenders would receive the most 
favorable, lightly regulated treatment of any consumer financial service provider in 
America. Collectively, the constraints placed on the CFPB by the proposed Financial 
Choice Act of 2017 would severely restrain actual law enforcement at the new consumer 
law enforcement agency. 
 
III. METHODS 
 
This study identifies and classifies every public CFPB enforcement case from the 
inception of the CFPB through the end of the 2016 calendar year. Public CFPB 
enforcement actions were identified through the CFPB’s website, press releases, annual 
reports to Congress, administrative adjudication docket, and searches of the Bureau’s 
unsealed federal court pleadings. For each case, the CFPB has released some legal 
                                                          
69 Id. at § 733 (“The Agency may not exercise any rulemaking, enforcement, or 
other authority with respect to payday loans, vehicle title loans, or other similar 
loans.”). 
70 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 PENN. L. REV. 101, 
155–156 (2008); DEP’T OF DEF., REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING 
PRACTICES DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR 
DEPENDENTS 39-46 (2006); Christopher L. Peterson, “Warning: Predatory Lender” – A 
Proposal for Candid Predatory Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893, 928 
(2012) (hereinafter Warning: Predatory Lender).  
71 THOMAS A. DURKIN, GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, MICHAEL E STATEN, & TODD 
ZYWICKI, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 394-96 (2014); Victor 
Stango, Are Payday Lending Markets Competitive?, REGULATION 26, 33 (Fall 2012) 
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2012/11/v35n3-
5.pdf; Todd Zywicki & Astrid Arca, The Case Against New Restrictions on Payday Lending, 
64 MERCATUS ON POLICY 1, 2 (2009), 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/MOP64_FMWG_Payday%20Lending_web.
pdf. 
72 See Peterson, supra note 70, at 894. 
73 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536 (explaining that covered persons providing 
consumer financial products are prohibited from unfair, deceptive or abusive 
practices). 
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documentation of the enforcement matter. Typically, these documents include one or 
more of the following: a notice of charges, a complaint, a consent order, a stipulation 
consenting to issuance of a consent order, or a settlement agreement. For cases pursued 
through the CFPB’s administrative enforcement procedures, the Bureau’s Office of 
Administrative Adjudication (“OAA”) maintains a docket sheet that includes all 
publicly available pleadings, motions, and orders.  For cases in litigation, court filings 
were accessed as necessary through the publicly available PACER system provided by 
the U.S. judiciary. 
For each of the CFPB’s public enforcement matters, these documents were 
reviewed and coded using over 70 different variables.  The data set analyzed in this 
study updates and expands upon a data set compiled for a previous study reported in 
the Tulane Law Review.74 Coded variables included:  the date the Bureau announced each 
case; the date the case was resolved (if any); whether the case was filed as an 
administrative enforcement matter or in U.S. district court; whether the case was settled 
or contested upon announcement; whether the case involved a bank, credit union, or 
some other non-depository company; whether the Bureau charged an individual 
defendant with violating the law; and dollar amounts of total consumer redress and civil 
money penalties awarded in all consent orders, final administrative orders, or judgments 
imposed in every concluded matter.75 This study also classifies every violation of law 
the CFPB has asserted in public enforcement actions based on the statute providing 
the legal authority for the claim.  These classifications include all 18 enumerated statutes 
set out in the Dodd-Frank Act, additional law that Congress subsequently added to the 
Bureau’s enforcement jurisdiction, as well as the Bureau’s unfair, deceptive, and abusive 
acts or practices (“UDAAP”) authorities. This study also classified the financial product 
or service involved in each case based on the following categories: credit cards, 
mortgage loans, student loans, automobile purchase loans, nonauto retail finance, 
deposit accounts, remittances, pawn credit, payday loans (including similar small 
installment loans and car title lending), medical debt, and payment processing services. 
Furthermore, this study adds a new dimension to the debate of the Choice Act by 
empirically testing a thought experiment: if the Choice Act had been controlling law 
from 2012 to 2016, how would the CFPB’s law enforcement cases have changed? While 
the Choice Act includes broad structural, procedural and substantive changes to the 
CFPB and the laws it enforces, this thought experiment is limited to two substantive 
legal changes: (1) the elimination of the Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition of unfair, 
deceptive and abusive acts or practices and (2) the broad exemption for payday loans, 
car title loans, and other similar forms of small dollar lending. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
 
This Part presents two categories of results: (1) results tracking the CFPB’s 
enforcement track record through the 2016 calendar year and (2) results exploring the 
consequences of the Financial Choice Act of 2017. 
 
A.  The CFPB’s Enforcement Track Record through 2016 
 
                                                          
74 Peterson, CFPB Empirical Review, supra note 8, at 1073-76. 
75 Id. 
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In 2016, the CFPB continued to maintain a brisk pace of enforcement actions with 
a small decline in the number of announced actions in comparison to 2015. Figure 1 
provides a graphic representation of the number of public law enforcement cases 
announced by the CFPB juxtaposed with the number of CFPB employees by year. 
From 2012 through 2014, the total number of CFPB employees grew steadily as did the 
number of announced enforcement matters. The per-year number of cases peaked in 
2015 with 55 announced matters. In 2016 the CFPB announced 42 new enforcement 
matters. 
 
 
 
Table 1 provides further context by listing the monetary value in consumer relief 
and civil money penalties of public CFPB enforcement actions by year. These values 
are further classified by whether the consumer relief and civil money penalties were 
imposed upon banks, credit unions, or non-depository business. In 2016 the CFPB 
imposed nearly $196 million in civil money penalties, an amount comparable to the 
$205 million imposed in 2015. However, total consumer relief declined significantly 
from $6.5 billion in 2015 to $292 million in 2016. Calendar year 2016 did see the first 
CFPB public enforcement action against a credit union. The CFPB signed a consent 
order with Navy Federal Credit Union providing $23 million in consumer relief and a 
$5.5 million civil money penalty for misleading customers about its debt collection 
practices and unlawfully restricting consumers’ access to their own funds.76 Credit 
Unions, only less than a half dozen of which meet the $10 billion asset threshold for 
CFPB jurisdiction, have only paid about two-tenths of one percent of all consumer 
relief. In comparison, through 2016 the CFPB has generated approximately $7.4 billion 
in consumer relief from banks and about $4 billion in consumer relief from non-
depository consumer financial services companies. 
  
                                                          
76 In re Navy Fed. Credit Union, CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0024 (Oct. 11, 2016), 
http:// 
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/102016_cfpb_NavyFederalConsentOrder.p
df. 
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Figure 1. Public CFPB enforcement cases and total 
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Table 1. Total consumer relief and civil money penalties in public CFPB 
enforcement actions against banks, nonbanks, and credit unions, 2012-2016. 
  Total consumer relief Civil money penalties 
  $ % $ % 
2012 
banks  425,000,000  100.0  46,100,000  100.0 
nonbanks  100,000  0.0  5,000  0.0 
total  425,100,000  100.0  46,105,000  100.0 
2013 
banks  485,800,000  90.6  47,634,000  63.5 
nonbanks  50,539,465  9.4  27,366,002  36.5 
total  536,339,465  100.0  75,000,002  100.0 
2014 
banks  1,065,300,000  27.7  38,700,000  62.0 
nonbanks  2,784,071,234  72.3  23,736,076  38.0 
total  3,849,371,234  100.0  62,436,076  100.0 
2015 
banks  5,385,059,808  83.8  109,500,000  53.5 
nonbanks  1,042,537,401  16.2  95,229,004  46.5 
total  6,427,597,209  100.0  204,729,004  100.0 
2016 
banks  88,030,035  30.1  124,130,756  63.4 
nonbanks  181,437,672  62.0  66,104,001  33.8 
credit unions  23,000,000  7.9  5,500,000  2.8 
total  292,467,707  100.0  195,734,757  100.0 
Total 
banks  7,449,189,843  64.6  366,064,756  62.7 
nonbanks  4,058,685,772  35.2  212,440,083  36.4 
credit unions  23,000,000  0.2  5,500,000  0.9 
total  11,530,875,614  100.0  584,004,839  100.0 
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions 2012-2016.  
 
Table 2 shows trends in the settlement of CFPB cases alongside the CFPB’s 
decision to charge an individual defendant in each enforcement action. With respect to 
the former, in 17 out of 42 enforcement actions announced in 2016, at least one 
defendant had not reached a settlement agreement with the Bureau. With about 40 
percent of cases contested, 2016 saw a significant uptick in the proportion of cases 
where the CFPB had not concluded a settlement agreement at the time it announced 
each action. Nevertheless, nine of the 17 contested cases were relatively minor disputes 
that the CFPB brought as part of two “sweeps.” The first was a sweep of car title lenders 
in Arizona that were violating the Truth in Lending Act’s restriction on advertising 
interest rates in a format other than an annual percentage rate.77 All of the cases were 
settled shortly after announcement with consent to a relatively modest civil money 
penalty.  The second sweep focused on several pawnshops in Virginia that were 
                                                          
77 15 U.S.C. § 1664(c); Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Sues Five Arizona Title 
Lenders for Failing to Disclose Loan Annual Percentage Rate to Consumers 
(September 21, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-
us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-five-arizona-title-lenders-failing-disclose-loan-annual-
percentage-rate-consumers/. 
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providing consumers with inaccurate TILA price disclosures. 78 Like the Arizona sweep, 
each case resolved quickly with a civil money penalty. Placing these matters to the side, 
the eight remaining contested cases reflect a level of settlement comparable to prior 
years.  
The rate at which the CFPB charged at least one individual person in public 
enforcement actions declined slightly in 2016. In prior years, the CFPB included charges 
against at least one individual person in between 25 and 37 percent of cases. In 2016, 9 
out of 42 enforcement cases included charges against an individual person reflecting a 
rate of about 21 percent. Whether the Bureau charges individuals in public enforcement 
actions is important, because a key lesson of the financial crisis was the importance of 
holding individual employees accountable for corporate wrongdoing.79 On the other 
hand, charging individual defendants decreases the likelihood of achieving a settlement 
and increases the resources the Bureau must dedicate to each matter. Overall the Bureau 
has charged an individual defendant in 28 percent of its public enforcement cases.  
 
 
Table 2.  Settlement, individual accountability, and deception in 
public CFPB enforcement actions by year, 2012-2016. 
 
All cases Cases contested at filing 
Cases w/ 
individual charged 
 n n % n % 
2012 8 2 25.0 3 37.5 
2013 27 6 22.2 8 29.6 
2014 32 11 34.4 12 37.5 
2015 55 10 18.2 14 25.5 
2016 42 17 40.5 9 21.4 
total 164 46 28.0 46 28.0 
Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 2012-
2016. 
 
In the years following passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the legal theory that 
generated the most discussion and controversy was the prohibition of “abusive” 
practices, an addition to the longer-standing restrictions on deceptive and unfair 
conduct. Some have expressed concern that a general prohibition of abusive practices 
would allow the CFPB to use an ‘I know it when I see it’ approach to enforcement that 
                                                          
78 15 U.S.C. § 1607(a)(6); Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Takes Action Against 
Pawn Companies for Deceiving Consumers About Loan Costs (December 19, 2016), 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-
pawn-companies-deceiving-consumers-about-loan-costs/. 
 79.  U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 6, at xix. See also Emily 
Stephenson, U.S. Consumer Watchdog Says Committed to Stiff Penalties, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-washington-summit-cordray-
idUSBRE99M1K520131023 (statement of Richard Cordray) (“I’ve always felt strongly 
that you can’t only go after companies. Companies run through individuals, and 
individuals need to know that they’re at risk when they do bad things under the umbrella 
of a company.”). 
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could lead to abuse of government power.80 Table 3 provides an interesting contrast 
between CFPB cases that included deceptive practices claims and cases that included 
abusive practices claims. In every year of the CFPB’s existence the number and size of 
cases attacking false or misleading claims far outstrips those cases challenging abusive 
practices. Reflecting trends of previous years, in 2016 a majority of all CFPB cases (23 
out of 42) included at least one claim challenging false or misleading material statements 
made by a bank, credit union, or financial service provider. Moreover, the largest CFPB 
cases as measured by relief provided to American consumers have overwhelmingly 
included claims attacking deceptive practices. In the history of the CFPB, over 93 
percent of all consumer relief was awarded in cases where the business deceived its 
customers about a material fact. In contrast, the CFPB has accused businesses of 
engaging in abusive practices relatively infrequently and only in relatively small cases. 
Overall, consumer relief in cases alleging abusive practices constituted only around 1 
percent of all consumer relief awarded in CFPB enforcement actions. Indeed, these 
data suggest that above all else, the CFPB’s enforcement program has focused on 
promoting truthfulness in consumer finance.  
 
Table 3. Deceptive practices vs. abusive practices in public CFPB 
enforcement cases, 2012-2016. 
 Cases pleading deceptive practices Cases pleading abusive practices 
 n %  consumer relief $ x 1000* % n %  
consumer relief $ 
x 1000* % 
2012 7 87.5 437,058.0 97.44 0 0.0 .0 0.00 
2013 12 44.4 2,372,481.7 84.56 2 7.4 499.2 0.02 
2014 18 56.3 2,154,125.0 94.74 5 15.6 99,529.1 4.38 
2015 37 67.3 5,784,886.5 96.58 8 14.5 20,778.0 0.35 
2016 23 54.8 127,379.2 79.98 7 16.7 3,103.1 1.95 
total 97 59.1 10,875,930.4 93.14 22 13.4 123,909.5 1.06 
*Total consumer relief figures reflect awards generated in cases that included each type of 
enumerated statutory claim. However, monetary awards may be attributable to multiple violations 
of different laws asserted in each case. Year of award calculations are based on the date first filing 
in each case and include cases first announced by December 31, 2016 with final consumer relief 
awarded prior to July 1, 2017. Source: Analysis of publicly announced CFPB enforcement actions, 
2012-2016. 
 
B.   Understanding the Financial Choice Act of 2017 through the Lens of 
Past CFPB Enforcement Actions 
 
The CFPB’s track record of focusing on correcting deceptive financial practices 
contrasts sharply with the proposed Financial Choice Act of 2017. Table 4 presents 
data on how sections 733, 734, and 735 of the Choice Act would have affected the 
CFPB’s enforcement track record if these sections had been controlling law at the time 
                                                          
80 Reginald R. Goeke, Is the CFPB Torturing Language with Its Abusive Standard?, 
LAW360 (Feb. 12, 2015, 5:41 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/621386/is-the-
cfpb-torturing-language-with-its-abusive-standard-?article_related_content=1 (“This 
‘I know it when I see it’ approach naturally grants the CFPB the maximum flexibility 
to bring enforcement actions, while granting industry participants the minimum level 
of notice about what is required of them.”). 
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of each case. Section 733 would eliminate regulatory and enforcement jurisdiction over 
payday loans, car title loans, and other similar forms of small dollar credit.81 Section 734 
would repeal the Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition of deceptive, unfair, and abusive 
consumer finance.82 Looking back at CFPB enforcement actions, those cases that only 
pleaded UDAAP claims would not have been possible if section 734 of the Choice Act 
were in effect. Similarly, every CFPB case involving payday or automobile title lending 
would have been untenable if section 733 were controlling law. The effect of these two 
changes is tallied for a selected list of product or service types in Table 4. Notably, 13 
of the CFPB’s 52 mortgage cases only included UDAAP charges and therefore would 
have been eliminated. Forty-one percent of debt collection cases would have been 
eliminated and 63 percent of credit card cases would have been impossible. And of 
course, all 24 of the CFPB’s payday lending related cases would have been unviable if 
section 733 of the Choice Act had been controlling law at the time of each case. Indeed, 
a large proportion of the CFPB’s cases in virtually every type of financial product or 
service would have been impossible if the Choice Act had been in effect from 2012 to 
2016.  
Nevertheless, focusing on eliminated cases actually understates the effect the 
Choice Act would have had upon the CFPB’s track record. In addition to eliminated 
cases, the right-hand columns in table 4 adds those cases that would have been seriously 
weakened by the Choice Act for one or more of three reasons. First the right-hand 
columns include those cases where at least one UDAAP claim would have been 
eliminated under section 733 but one or more claims under an enumerated statute 
would have remained. Many CFPB cases include both UDAAP claims as well as one 
or more causes of action arising out of an enumerated statute such as the Truth in 
Lending Act or the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. However, violations that sound 
in UDAAP law are often more serious and associated with more consumer harm than 
what are sometimes technical violations of enumerated statutes. The elimination of 
UDAAP jurisdiction would seriously weaken these enforcement actions. Second, the 
right-hand columns include cases some courts might have considered to be beyond 
CFPB jurisdiction because they involved a form of small dollar credit similar to payday 
loans. While section 733 of the Choice Act provides an exemption to “payday loans, 
vehicle title loans, or other similar loans,” the Act does not provide guidance on what 
types of credit are “similar” to payday loans. Arguably, defendants in pawn shop cases 
and some forms of installment lending cases could claim they too qualify for the Choice 
Act’s small dollar lending exemption. These cases would have been severely weakened 
by the Choice Act because the CFPBs jurisdiction to would have been unclear. And 
third, the right-hand columns also add cases that included Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act claims, which would have been undermined by repeal of the CFPB’s guidance on 
racial discrimination in automobile finance in section 735 of the Choice Act.83 With an 
explicit rebuke from Congress, the authority of the CFPB to challenge auto finance 
company kick-backs to car dealers in exchange for delivering above par interest rate 
loans to Black and Latino borrowers would have been much less certain.  
With the notable exception of mortgage lending cases arising under the Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act,84 the combined effect of sections 733, 734 and 735 of the 
                                                          
81 H.R. 10 § 733 (2017). 
82 H.R. 10 § 734 (2017). 
83 Id. at § 735. 
84 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 
1724 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. ch. 27). 
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Choice Act would have been to eliminate or severely weaken almost every CFPB 
enforcement case. If the Choice Act had been in effect, every single CFPB enforcement 
action involving credit cards, payday loans, ancillary “add-on” products, debt relief 
services, automobile financing, student loans, payment processing, checking or savings 
accounts, and pawnshops would have either been eliminated or substantially weakened. 
The Choice Act would also have eliminated or seriously weakened 38 out of 39 debt 
collection cases and four out of five retail finance cases. 
 
Table 4. CFPB Enforcement Actions from 2012-2016 that would have been 
eliminated or weakened under the Financial Choice Act of 2017 by affected 
financial product or service. 
Financial product 
or service 
Actual 
CFPB 
cases 
Cases eliminated Cases eliminated or seriously weakened 
n %  n %  
Mortgages 52 13 25.0% 22 42.3% 
Debt collection 39 16 41.0% 38 97.4% 
Credit cards 27 17 63.0% 27 100.0% 
Payday/auto title 24 24 100.0% 24 100.0% 
Ancillary products 18 13 72.2% 18 100.0% 
Debt relief services 16 12 75.0% 16 100.0% 
Auto finance 12 3 25.0% 12 100.0% 
Student loans 10 3 30.0% 10 100.0% 
Payment processing 9 8 88.9% 9 100.0% 
Deposit accounts 6 3 50.0% 6 100.0% 
Retail finance 5 2 40.0% 4 80.0% 
Pawn loans 5 0 0.0% 5 100.0% 
Remittances 0 0 n/a 0 n/a 
Source: Analysis of Financial Choice Act of 2017, H.R. 10 §§ 733, 734, 735 in relation to public CFPB 
Enforcement Actions, 2012-2016.  
 
Placing to the side those cases that the Choice Act merely would have weakened, 
the Choice Act would have entirely eliminated those CFPB cases that provided the vast 
majority of actual relief to American consumers. Table 5 tallies the consumer 
restitution, forgiven debts, and other direct consumer relief provided to the American 
public in CFPB cases that either exclusively pleaded UDAAP claims or involved payday 
lending. While the Choice Act would not have explicitly prohibited 75 percent of the 
CFPB’s mortgage lending cases, the 25 percent of those cases that would have been 
eliminated generated 91.5 percent of the relief provided to consumers. Similarly, the 
41% of debt collection cases eliminated by the Choice Act accounted for 87% of the 
relief provided to the public. Furthermore, the seventeen eliminated credit card cases 
were responsible for providing $6.7 billion in relief to consumers, accounting for 94 
percent of the compensation to the public for illegal practices associated with that type 
of product. Across every type of financial service, the Choice Act’s elimination of 
UDAAP claims—especially those claims attacking deceptive practices—would have 
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protected those consumer finance businesses that the CFPB found to have caused the 
most harm to the largest number of Americans.  
 
Table 5.  Consumer Relief in 2012-2016 public CFPB enforcement 
actions that would have been eliminated under the Financial 
Choice Act of 2017 by affected financial product or service. 
Financial product 
or service 
Consumer relief 
in actual CFPB 
cases 
Effect of cases eliminated by 
the Choice Act  
Eliminated 
consumer relief 
% 
change 
Mortgages $2,960,370,784 -$2,709,055,737 -91.5% 
Debt collection $6,791,303,658 -$5,935,777,783 -87.4% 
Credit cards $7,170,024,170 -$6,763,754,170 -94.3% 
Payday/auto title $73,235,927 -$73,235,927 -100.0% 
Ancillary products $2,453,511,025 -$2,165,111,025 -88.2% 
Debt relief services $298,590,242 -$257,375,522 -86.2% 
Auto finance $197,487,783 -$49,687,783 -25.2% 
Student loans $525,480,184 -$23,870,184 -4.5% 
Payment processing $144,164,150 -$144,164,150 -100.0% 
Deposit accounts $88,303,145 -$36,403,145 -41.2% 
Retail finance $95,579,124 -$1,050,000 -1.1% 
Pawn loans $0 $0 n/a 
Remittances $0 $0 n/a 
Source: Analysis of Financial Choice Act of 2017, H.R. 10 §§ 733, 735 in relation to 
Public CFPB Enforcement Actions, 2012-2016.This table attributes awarded consumer 
relief to multiple product or service classifications for cases relating to more than one 
type of product or service and includes cases announced by December 31, 2016 with final 
consumer relief awarded prior to July 1, 2017.  
 
 
Similarly, Table 6 shows the effect the proposed elimination of UDAAP 
authority and payday lending jurisdiction would have had on civil money penalties 
imposed by the CFPB from 2012 to 2016. Similar to the effect of the Choice Act 
upon consumer relief, had the proposed legislation been in effect, it would have vastly 
reduced the fines the CFPB imposed on companies that engaged in unfair, deceptive, 
or abusive practices. For example, those cases accounting for nearly 95 percent of the 
civil money penalties imposed by the CFPB relating to credit cards would have been 
eliminated. Moreover, the Choice Act would have wiped out all of the fines related to 
payment processing and deposit accounts. Most notably, in 2016 the CFPB imposed a 
$100 million fine on Wells Fargo for fraudulently creating over two million fake, 
unauthorized bank accounts in the names of its customers. The CFPB challenged this 
practice using the UDAAP authority that the Choice Act proposes to eliminate. 
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Table 6. Civil Money Penalties in 2012-2016 CFPB Enforcement 
Actions that Would Have Been Eliminated Under the Financial 
Choice Act of 2017 by Effected Financial Product or Service. 
Financial product 
or service 
CMPs in 
actual 
CFPB cases 
Effect of cases eliminated 
by the Choice Act  
Eliminated 
CMPs 
% 
change 
Mortgages $124,197,759 -$16,213,001 -13.1% 
Debt collection $173,980,000 -$100,750,000 -57.9% 
Credit cards $280,700,000 -$266,100,000 -94.8% 
Payday/auto title $28,942,000 -$28,942,000 -100.0% 
Ancillary products $133,250,000 -$124,150,000 -93.2% 
Debt relief services $134,336,003 -$112,421,002 -83.7% 
Auto finance $40,465,000 -$5,250,000 -13.0% 
Student loans $14,175,002 -$8,025,001 -56.6% 
Payment processing $12,476,000 -$12,476,000 -100.0% 
Deposit accounts $130,700,000 -$113,000,000 -86.5% 
Retail finance $350,001 -$50,000 -14.3% 
Pawn loans $27,500 $0 0.0% 
Remittances $0 $0 n/a 
Source: Analysis of Financial Choice Act of 2017, H.R. 10 §§ 733 and735 in relation to 
public CFPB Enforcement Actions, 2012-2016. This table attributes awarded civil 
money penalties to multiple product or service classifications for cases relating to more 
than one type of product or service and includes cases announced by December 31, 
2016 with final consumer relief awarded prior to July 1, 2017. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The Financial Choice Act of 2017 is appropriately named in at least one sense: its 
proposed restrictions on the authority of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
reflect a choice by the House of Representatives to protect financial companies at the 
expense of consumers. This choice is borne out by the data. As this empirical review of 
CFPB enforcement cases demonstrates, nearly all of the relief provided to American 
consumers in CFPB enforcement cases arose where a bank, credit union, or other 
finance company deceived their customers about a material aspect of their product or 
service. Between 2012 and 2016, the CFPB’s enforcement efforts generated $10.5 
billion in consumer relief –accounting for 93 percent of all compensation—in cases that 
included a deceptive-practices claim. Had the Choice Act been in effect, the CFPB 
would have been powerless to stop the deception of American consumers by financial 
corporations within its jurisdiction.  This change alone would have eliminated or 
seriously weakened the vast majority of CFPB cases. Moreover, the Choice Act’s 
blanket exemption on law enforcement cases involving payday loans and similar forms 
of credit would have eliminated at least 24 enforcement cases where the CFPB found 
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payday or vehicle title lenders breaking the law, generating $73 million in consumer 
relief and $28 million dollars in civil money penalties. Between the Choice Act’s 
elimination of UDAAP claims and its proposed exemption for payday lenders, had the 
Act been in effect from 2012 to 2016, many consumers would have lost out on billions 
of dollars of relief, and even more would have fallen prey to unchecked violations of 
numerous consumer protection laws. This empirical comparison of the proposed 
Choice Act’s provisions to the CFPB’s law enforcement track record leaves little doubt 
that if the bill passes, meaningful consumer law enforcement will grind to a halt within 
the rebranded Consumer Law Enforcement Agency. Indeed, the Choice Act’s renaming 
of the CFPB as the Consumer Law Enforcement Agency is ironic and misleading. The 
Choice Act makes a stark and unapologetic choice favoring corporate wrongdoing and 
lawlessness over consumers 
